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recommendations regarding the future operation of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 
(PFIAB).  We hope that, in both cases, we have added to the literature on intelligence and have raised 
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in strengthening the intelligence advice provided the president.
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1Introduction
The precursor to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the President’s 
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA), was established by President Dwight 
Eisenhower in 1956 to provide the president with nonpartisan evaluation of the role and effectiveness of 
U.S. intelligence collection, counterintelligence, covert action operations, and intelligence analysis.  Over 
the years, the Board has evolved in terms of both structure and membership to reflect the needs of the 
times and preferences of each president.  In some instances, the Board has played a central role in advising 
the president and the intelligence community on crucial issues of substance or procedure and has made a 
significant contribution to the country’s national security.  In other instances, the Board has been ignored 
and treated as a dumping ground for rewarding political cronies. In the Carter Administration, it was 
never even reconstituted.  Needless to say, in those instances, the Board made little contribution to helping 
presidents get the best intelligence they could.
Clearly, it is in the interest of future presidents, not to speak of the nation, to make the best possible 
use of the PFIAB for two reasons.  The PFIAB is now a political fact of life.  Presidents have little latitude 
to abolish or ignore the Board.  President Carter tried the former and paid a political price for doing so in 
the 1980 election.  President George H.W. Bush initially ignored the Reagan Board after taking office in 
1989, but by 1990 found that he had to reorganize the Board and involve it in at least some intelligence-
related deliberations.
Beyond such political considerations, there is a second reason for thinking hard about how the Board 
can best assist the president in managing the intelligence community.  An independent advisory panel made 
up of experts from a broad range of backgrounds can offer the president a unique and valuable perspective 
on intelligence issues.  As we show in this report, the PFIAB has, with a few notable exceptions, studied 
almost every important intelligence issue and problem since the Eisenhower Administration. Moreover, 
the Board has made important recommendations – the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Directorate 
of Science and Technology – that have clearly affected the intelligence community.  At times the Board’s 
recommendations have been important factors in intelligence-related policy decisions.  Finally, while the 
Board has not consistently lived up to its potential as an intelligence advisory body for presidents in the past, 
this great potential is enough to warrant thinking hard about how it might be better realized in the future.
In the past few years, the U.S. government has established new centers and other organizations 
with an eye to enhance presidential coordination and oversight of intelligence.  The recent creation of 
the new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is the culmination of this trend.  The new DNI and his 
broad responsibilities were mandated in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act passed by 
Congress and signed into law by President Bush on December 17, 2004.  This is the most far-reaching 
reorganization of American intelligence since the legislation that created the CIA in 1947.  In this new 
environment created largely by the 9/11 tragedy it is particularly important to have a clear understanding 
of the role of the PFIAB, one of the smallest, most secretive, least well-known, but potentially most 
influential parts of the U.S. intelligence community 
This study undertakes such an analysis with the aim of providing a guideline for strengthening 
the role of the PFIAB in the years to come.  The aim of our analysis is to determine what have been 
the strengths and weaknesses of the PFIAB in the past and to identify a productive role for the PFIAB 
in this new environment.  Given the current intelligence needs of the country, such an examination is 
paramount.  It will help to clarify the role of the PFIAB and shed light on the interrelationship of various 
intelligence components.  Most importantly, it will provide recommendations for future presidents to 
redefine, and possibly augment, the role of the Board, thereby helping to improve the performance of the 
U.S. intelligence community.
Why Study the PFIAB?
In the wake of the 9/11 tragedy, the efficiency of U.S. intelligence came under intense scrutiny, 
with a particular focus on the resources, methods, and coordination – or, more fittingly, lack thereof – 
among various intelligence agencies.  The outcome was threefold: the Patriot Act, with its various domestic 
2features aimed at tightening any security loopholes; the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, 
whose goal is to protect the nation; and the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 
In addition, the various intelligence agencies reorganized their own organizations and revamped procedures 
to be more effective in their missions.
The goal of this series of changes was to present to the president and national security decision- 
makers the best intelligence possible.  While these changes were still taking place, the George W. Bush 
Administration went to war in Iraq in 2003 on the assumption that the country possessed weapons of mass 
destruction and meaningful links with al Qaeda.  The discovery that neither of these was the case raised 
the issues of how, why, and when intelligence has been used, or failed to be used, by those who make the 
ultimate decision on the use of intelligence.
The one institution that is not blinded by preconceived ideas or institutional links  and that can be of 
great use in thinking through these issues is the PFIAB.  The Board can be useful in helping the president 
steer U.S. intelligence in the right direction in its exploitation of new technology, adoption of new methods 
of analysis, and reorganizations to deal with the new intelligence environment the United States faces.
To date, no detailed analysis of the PFIAB has been conducted primarily because there is very little 
information publicly available about the activities of the Board over the years.  There are only a handful 
of studies of the Board – two by the Congressional Research Service and one by the Hale Foundation (a 
private association of retired intelligence professionals) – and none contain much specific information 
about what issues the Board addressed, how it operated, and what impact it had on policy.1  Moreover, 
while there is a large and generally very good literature on the rest of the U.S. intelligence community, it 
contains only the sketchiest of accounts of the PFIAB’s role.2  It is fair to say that the Board is one of the 
least-known components of the U.S. intelligence community.
Why has there been so little discussion of the PFIAB in the otherwise voluminous literature on the 
American intelligence community?  One possibility is that the Board has not been an important player in 
the major intelligence issues since its inception.  For example, the Church Committee staff’s comprehensive 
“History of the Central Intelligence Agency” devoted only a few pages to the Board, remarking in passing 
upon its “impotence.”3  We reject this explanation because, as we will show in the following pages, the 
Board has been at the center of many of the most important intelligence decisions of the past fifty years.
Instead, we believe that the lack of discussion of the PFIAB is the result of two other factors.  First, 
the Board has historically had access to the most highly classified intelligence from the entire intelligence 
community and has dealt with some of the most sensitive, substantive, and procedural issues the community 
has faced.  Given that, it is not surprising that very few of its deliberations and recommendations would be 
declassified, even after almost fifty years.  Second, in addition to the sensitivity of the issues it considered, 
the Board also falls under the purview of executive privilege, and, as such, its records are exempt from 
mandatory declassification along with those of other high-level presidential advisory bodies.  The historical 
records of the PFIAB are held by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), exempt 
from normal declassification procedures and not open to the public, despite the fact that contemporary 
records from other parts of the intelligence community and the National Security Council (NSC) have 
long since been made available to scholars. The PFIAB is little known not because it has been irrelevant, 
but rather because its secrets have been hidden behind two seals: secrecy and executive privilege.
1 Congressional Research Service, Report 96-619F, Intelligence Oversight in the White House: The President’s Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board and the Intelligence Oversight Board, by H. Andrew Boerstling and Richard A. Best (Washington, 
D.C.: Library of Congress, 1996); Congressional Research Service, Report 75-225F, The President’s Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board: An Historical and Contemporary Analysis (1955-1975) (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1975); The 
Hale Foundation, The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) (Washington, D.C.: The Hale Foundation, Inc., 
1981).
2 For example, see Jeffery Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985), 
287 & 307.
3 Anne Karalakas, “History of the Central Intelligence Agency” in The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents ed. 
William M. Leary, (Birmingham, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1984), 74.
3Some current and former PFIAB personnel have gone to great lengths to maintain the shroud of 
secrecy surrounding the Board.  Long-term Board member and Chair Leo Cherne repeatedly emphasized 
to his fellow Board members that the PFIAB was special, in part, because it was the one part of the U.S. 
government that never leaked, and he regularly refused to cooperate with investigations of the PFIAB by 
other parts of the intelligence community and the congressional oversight committees.4
When scholars do try to conduct detailed investigations of the PFIAB, they have often encountered 
active opposition from some PFIAB members and staffs.  For example, when we approached a number of 
former PFIAB chairs regarding this project, one not only refused to cooperate, but also actively discouraged 
others from participating in the project.5  Fortunately, this effort did not succeed, though it did make other 
PFIAB chairs, former members, and executive staffers hesitant about being interviewed on the record.
Given these serious obstacles, readers may wonder how we were able to proceed at all with this 
study beyond the very sketchy accounts available in the two Congressional Research Service reports and 
the Hale Foundation pamphlet?  Despite the cult of secrecy among Board chairs, members, and staff, there 
is actually a substantial amount of information available in the public domain about the Board’s activities. 
This is true not only of the period before the Reagan Administration, but also today.  Press coverage of 
the PFIAB’s activities has been continuous.6  But sometimes the Board has made public, or at least semi-
public, important insights into its activities.  Under President Clinton, the Board was charged with a 
major study of security lapses at the nation’s nuclear laboratories, and its findings were publicly released 
by the administration.7  Additionally, there is a wealth of other open-source materials available that sheds 
light on the Board’s activities.  These include declassified PFIAB reports and PFIAB-related material in 
other government publications like the Department of State’s historical series Foreign Relations of the 
United States and various CIA historical publications.  Finally, memoirs of presidents and other high-level 
governmental officials contain important information about the activities of the Board.
Even though the records of the PFIAB proper remain classified under the twin seals of secrecy 
and executive privilege, we have managed to amass a significant amount of primary source material from 
various archives containing records of organizations that worked closely with the Board.  Research team 
members went to presidential archives from Eisenhower through Clinton (with the exception of the Reagan 
archives, which we determined had no declassified materials on the PFIAB available) and consulted 
records of other parts of the executive office of the president including the NSC, the White House Office 
of Presidential Personnel, and the White House Counsel which contain much material relevant to the 
PFIAB’s activities.  Team members have also visited other archives including the National Archives and 
Records Administration (CIA’s CREST on-line documents), MIT Library Archives (Thomas J. Killian 
Papers), National Security Archives (George Washington University), and Boston University (Leo Cherne 
Papers) and found much additional material relating to the Board’s activities.
 Finally, former PFIAB members have not always been reticent about discussing their experiences 
with the Board.  Then PFIAB Chair Warren Rudman gave extensive public comments about the Board in 
a seminar he participated in at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.8  Other former PFIAB 
4 Leo Cherne, Memorandum entitled “A PFIAB Valedictory,” September 21, 1988; Leo Cherne, Memorandum for the Record, 
August 3, 1983; PFIAB (July-December 1983); Leo Cherne Papers; Department of Special Collections; Howard Gottlieb Archival 
Research Center (HGARC), Boston University.   
5 Warren Rudman, former PFIAB Chair, letter to Roman Popadiuk, March 8, 2006.
6 Most recently, see  “Advisory Panel Convinced Bush to Oust Goss,” The Sunday Capital (Annapolis), May 7, 2006.
7 President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board: A Special Investigative Panel, Science at its Best, Security at its Worst: A 
Report on Security Problems at the U.S. Department of Energy (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1999).  The report is also available, as 
of October 17, 2007, at: http://cio.energy.gov/pfiab-doe.pdf.
8 Warren Rudman, Perspectives on National Security in the Twenty-First Century, Seminar on Intelligence, Command, and 
Control at Harvard University (Boston), April 22, 2002.
49 Anne L. Armstrong to Leo Cherne, Washington, D.C., September 20, 1984; PFIAB-Misc. 1/01/84-11/31/85; Leo Cherne Papers; 
Department of Special Collections; HGARC; Seymour Weiss to Anne Armstrong, Bethesda, MD, September 27, 1984; PFIAB- 
Misc. 01/01/84-11/31/85; Leo Cherne Papers; Department of Special Collections: HGARC; Leo Cherne to Anne Armstrong, New 
York, NY, October 10, 1984; PFIAB-Misc. 01/01/84-11/31/85; Leo Cherne Papers; Department of Special Collections; HGARC; 
Robert F. Six to Anne L. Armstrong, Los Angeles, CA, October 22, 1984; PFIAB-Misc. 01/01/84-11/31/85; Leo Cherne Papers; 
Department of Special Collections; HGARC.
chairs, members, staffers, as well as other members of the intelligence community who interacted with the 
Board, have cooperated in our project through extensive and detailed interviews.  These interviews have 
made it possible to reconstruct in great detail the activities of the PFIAB, especially in recent years.  For 
obvious reasons, most of these interviews were off the record. Without exception, all interviewees were 
told that this was to be an unclassified study.
Over the years, there have been a number of efforts from within the PFIAB to assess its role and 
function to better serve the president, but this study should also provide an important outside perspective 
on the Board and the issues it faces as it seeks to reorient itself to meet the challenges of the new security 
environment our country faces.9  In addition to helping future presidents make the best possible use of the 
PFIAB, we think that this report will accomplish two further goals.  It will provide the public with a better 
understanding of the history of the PFIAB and also with a fuller sense of the role of American intelligence 
in national security decision-making.
How the PFIAB Works
The PFIAB is housed in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building on the White House grounds. 
It operates on a part-time basis and, traditionally, has met approximately every other month for two to 
three days.  The current Board now meets on a monthly basis.  While the Boards have regularly scheduled 
meetings, they have also set up ad hoc sessions as needed and have created subcommittees to deal with 
various issues.  The Board generally reports to the president through the NSC advisor but does meet with 
the president on occasion.
The Board has a chair and an executive director appointed by the president and, traditionally, has had 
a permanent executive staff of three to four members.  Here, too, the current Board is different.  President 
George W. Bush’s PFIAB staff has grown to eight to ten members in his second term.  The staff, mainly 
intelligence experts detailed to the Board from various government agencies, serves as the institutional 
memory across administrations.  These agencies absorb the salaries of those individuals since the PFIAB 
has no independent budget.  Most expenses are administrative, such as travel and office upkeep.
PFIAB membership has fluctuated between six and twenty-one individuals appointed by the 
president.  The vetting process, however, usually involves the White House Office of Presidential Personnel. 
Various members of the PFIAB, mostly the chair, have made recommendations on appointments.  Members 
of the Board have been drawn from business, science, academia, the military, past practitioners in the fields 
of international and security affairs, and politicians.  Through the Nixon presidency, there was a degree of 
expertise and continuity as many Board members served across administrations.  PFIAB members receive 
no salary; their compensation is limited to a per diem for the days they meet.
Members take an oath not to divulge classified information that they obtain through their service nor 
are they allowed to discuss their deliberations on the subjects they review.  Their access is unlimited; they 
can access the intelligence information from all sixteen agencies of the American intelligence community 
– including the CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the DIA, and the National Security Agency 
(NSA).  Throughout the years there has not been any security leak on the part of the members, although 
there were accusations that the PFIAB leaked to the media the results of the 1976 Team B outside experts’ 
analysis of the Soviet threat.  Each Board has access to the resources of the government for expert advice. 
Boards have also consulted with non-government experts, some of whom have served as paid consultants. 
In addition, Board members have traveled overseas as part of their fact-finding and investigations.  PFIAB 
members also have the latitude to pursue areas of their own expertise.  Leo Cherne, a former chair and an 
economist, spent extra time and effort dealing with various government agencies on economic intelligence.
5The PFIAB has been largely bipartisan, including Democrats and Republicans, and its members 
have usually shunned overt partisan politics while members.  Eisenhower’s original Board, for example, was 
bipartisan and included notable Democrats such as former Virginia Governor and Congressman Colgate 
Darden, David K.E. Bruce, and Joseph P. Kennedy. There have, however, been some clear exceptions to 
the general rule. For example, Clark Clifford served as an advisor to President Johnson’s 1964 campaign 
and even helped to draft State of the Union speeches while he was the PFIAB’s chair.  Anne Armstrong, 
chair during Reagan’s presidency and a close associate of then Vice President Bush, served as the Texas 
representative of the 1988 Bush for President campaign during her tenure on the PFIAB.
The functioning of the Board depends not only upon the president’s direct interest but also on 
the personal relationship he has with its members, particularly the chair.  Each president issues a new 
executive order, or adopts the existing executive order of his predecessor, authorizing the creation of the 
Board and listing its mandate.  However, each of the mandates has remained basically consistent with the 
early orders dictated by Eisenhower and Kennedy.
In establishing the Board, Eisenhower was quite explicit regarding its scope and particular function. 
Eisenhower instructed the Board to examine the gamut of foreign intelligence activities throughout the 
government but with a particular focus on the CIA.  The Board’s mandate included evaluating intelligence, 
personnel, research, funds, security, and the effectiveness of specific activities.  Subsequent presidents, in 
setting up their PFIABs, usually gave a broad generic mandate to review intelligence.  President Nixon, 
however, added a specific charge.  A few days after issuing an executive order creating his PFIAB, Nixon 
tasked it to provide a yearly report on the nuclear threat that the Soviet Union posed.
While the PFIAB is responsible to the president, it does have enough leeway to initiate studies 
and to respond to concerns expressed by government agencies.  Nonetheless, the PFIAB faces the typical 
bureaucratic problem: opposition by agencies who feel their areas of jurisdiction are being infringed upon. 
For example, in 1968 the Department of Defense (DOD) opposed a PFIAB proposal to reinstitute an NSC 
panel to deal with Soviet strategic capabilities.  The secretary of defense at the time was Clark Clifford, a 
former chair of the PFIAB, underscoring the old cliché of “where you sit is where you stand.”  The PFIAB 
view, however, was eventually adopted when DOD created the Office of Net Assessment in 1973.
Lessons from the PFIAB’s Past
What remains is to determine whether the PFIAB has been able to provide presidents with the 
type of advice from which they, American intelligence, and the nation can benefit.  Board defenders hold 
that the PFIAB has played and can continue to play a useful role both for the president and for the overall 
intelligence community.  In this view, the PFIAB is uniquely positioned. On the one hand, it has access 
to all the top secrets of the government; on the other hand, it has direct access without any filters to the 
president, the ultimate decision-maker.  Thus, the PFIAB can serve as an amalgam of whistleblower, 
conceptual thinker, advisor, sounding board, or any other role the president envisages.  These roles are 
enhanced by the fact that the Board is unfettered by any bureaucratic links, oversight from other agencies, 
and limits as to its agenda. Properly configured, the Board has expertise unavailable within the rest of the 
intelligence community.  In short, the Board is positioned to be a powerful and effective tool that supports 
the president’s efforts to implement policies, change organizations, and manage the operations of the 
intelligence community.
 Critics maintain that the Board is duplicative, often populated by individuals who lack real expertise, 
highly politicized with many political appointees who lack the time and resources to consider issues in real 
depth, and critically dependent upon the president’s commitment to use it.  At best, in this view, the PFIAB 
appears to function merely as a channel for the intelligence community to voice its concerns and to advance 
its own agendas.  In this view, the recommendations that emanate out of the Board are rubber-stamped 
reports initiated more by the intelligence community rather than by the Board itself.  Several NSC 
advisors we interviewed could not remember anything substantive coming out of the PFIAB nor had any 
remarkable recollection of their interaction with the Board.  It should also be noted that over the years, 
while various commissions have praised the PFIAB, they have also recommended numerous steps to 
further enhance its role.  Ironically, these recommendations have also raised questions about whether the Board is
6actually fulfilling its mission and living up to its potential or whether, in fact, it may be an institution looking for 
a clearer role.
The key challenge we face is to determine whether the Board has successfully fulfilled its mandate. 
Presidential statements and evaluations of the PFIAB serve as one indicator of success.  However, presidents 
usually do not make such evaluations, at least not publicly.  Evaluations from other senior officials such 
as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), national security advisor, and secretaries of state and 
defense are also helpful.  Another method of measuring success is to examine the nature and breadth of 
issues and problems studied by a PFIAB, the Board’s recommendations to the president, and the extent 
to which these recommendations have been implemented.  Much of the information about issues studied 
is available in unclassified form, but specific recommendations and their subsequent implementation are 
often still classified.  Nonetheless, enough unclassified information is available through a variety of open 
sources to enable us to make a basic evaluation as to whether or not the PFIAB of a specific president was 
successful.
Using those criteria and evidence, we are able to conclude that each PFIAB has been generally 
successful in fulfilling its mandate under a president’s executive order.  We illustrate this conclusion in the 
following discussions of each president’s PFIAB.  Of course, it is impossible to speculate what would have 
happened if there were no PFIABs.  Each president could have used existing agencies or appointed ad hoc 
outside advisory bodies to provide studies and recommendations, but there is no way of knowing if such 
studies would have produced recommendations as thorough, objective, and non-partisan as those generally 
provided by the Board.  We have enough evidence to conclude that the PFIAB has provided valuable 
advice and recommendations on sensitive issues, including intelligence failures, to each president except 
for President Carter who did not have a PFIAB.  Many of these recommendations have been implemented 
by the presidents.
Historical Overview of the PFIAB
The history of the PFIAB can be divided into two phases with the Carter years serving as a dividing 
point.  The early PFIABs fit the mold of a disciplined professional advisory board.  This period included 
the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Administrations.  During these years the Board’s 
membership was small, averaging about eight to ten members.  Board members were prominent individuals, 
many with substantial U.S. government experience and with certain managerial or technical skills that were 
relevant to intelligence matters.  These early Boards, reflecting the intensifying technological race between 
East and West and the growing sophistication of intelligence collection, tended to focus upon science and 
technology issues and their roles in intelligence.  The Boards also met on a fairly regular basis with the 
president.  This was important both for the Board’s own standing within the intelligence community as 
well as for maintaining the president’s focus and interest in the Board’s activities.
The Eisenhower and Kennedy years were instrumental in the development of the PFIAB.  During 
these administrations much of the groundwork was laid for the future functioning of the PFIAB.  It was 
involved in numerous studies, most notably the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.  These two studies established the precedent for using the PFIAB as an investigative body to study 
the causes of past intelligence and policy failures, thus moving it away from any future policy-making 
role.  
The Reagan Administration revived the PFIAB following its disestablishment under the Carter 
Administration, thus ushering in the second historical phase of the Board.  Indeed, the Reagan team made 
Carter’s failure to reconstitute the PFIAB a campaign theme, holding it up as emblematic of the intelligence 
and foreign policy failures of the Carter presidency.  This, however, turned out to be more of a political 
ploy, aimed at questioning Carter’s ability to conduct foreign policy and not necessarily an indication of 
Reagan’s support of the PFIAB.  In fact, Reagan did not establish his own Board until October of 1981, 
almost a year into his first administration.  And once he did, he appointed as members a large number of 
individuals with little intelligence-related experience.  This action set a precedent for future presidents. 
Indeed, after Reagan, subsequent presidents would either reduce their use of the Board (George H.W. Bush 
and George W. Bush during his first term) or further politicize it (Clinton).
7There are three broad areas that the PFIAB has addressed over the years. First, the Board has long 
concerned itself with the impact of new technologies or innovative modes of organization on the collection 
and analysis of intelligence.  Second, the Board has also tried to analyze political developments, such as 
the famous Team B study of Soviet Cold War intentions.  Finally, upon occasion the Board has served as an 
instrument of crisis management, whether undertaking a critical postmortem after the Bay of Pigs debacle 
or bringing to the president’s attention a major failure of leadership in the intelligence community as it 
reportedly did in the case of DCI Porter Goss.  In the following pages we examine the role of the PFIAB 
in each administration.
Dwight D. Eisenhower
It is ironic that the first PFIAB, called the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence 
Activities (PBCFIA), was primarily created by President Eisenhower in January 1956 to head off an effort 
led by Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT) to mandate congressional oversight of the CIA and American 
intelligence.  The effort to impose congressional oversight of American intelligence failed at the time 
thanks to lobbying efforts by the Senate’s ruling inner club with help from the DCI. Congressional oversight 
would eventually be established in the mid-1970s by both the House and the Senate.  By then, the PFIAB 
had become well established as an advisory board to advise presidents on strategic and policy issues facing 
the CIA and the American intelligence community.  
Eisenhower created the Board by issuing Executive Order 10656.  Its initial membership was limited 
to eight.  They included leading or former businessmen, military officers, diplomats, politicians, and 
educators.  But Eisenhower also appointed to the Board some of the same leading scientists and engineers 
whom he had previously tapped to work closely with the CIA and the private sector in the development of 
the highly successful U-2 reconnaissance platform.  Such a combination of expertise became a model for 
efforts to stimulate new technology to enhance the performance of American intelligence.  There were no 
blatant cases of political cronyism in these appointments as there were in some future Boards, particularly 
the first Reagan Board.  The small number of Board members would become another characteristic of 
future successful Boards, also in contrast to the large number of members on the unwieldy first Reagan 
Board.
The PBCFIA produced forty-two separate recommendations for the president and the DCI 
before Eisenhower left office.  The president approved thirty-three of the recommendations, and while 
most of the Board’s agendas are still classified, it is possible to identify some significant achievements. 
Twenty-two of the Board’s recommendations were aimed at trying to get the DCI to exercise greater 
management of the intelligence community.  This would be a common thread of future Boards and 
most future presidents as well.  Subsequent DCIs, such as John McCone, embraced efforts to increase 
the DCI’s role as manager of the intelligence community. But Eisenhower’s DCI, Allen Dulles, with his 
collegial style of management resisted this effort. An example of an intelligence community initiative 
established just before Eisenhower left office was the new joint CIA-Military National Photographic 
Interpretation Center (NPIC).  It remained a very successful intelligence community operation until the 
late 1990s.  The PBCFIA also recommended creating a new unified United States Intelligence Board 
(USIB).  Yet, as we have seen under other presidents, the actual role and effectiveness of the DCI as 
intelligence community manager would depend as much on the attitude of the president, his national 
security advisor, and others, such as the secretaries of state and defense, as well as to the wording of 
executive orders.
In our view, the PBCFIA was successful under Eisenhower because of his deep knowledge and 
experience with intelligence during the Second World War and his support of the work of the DCI, the 
intelligence community, as well as the PBCFIA.  The fact that Eisenhower’s Board was small and competent 
and that its chair, Dr. James Killian, had Eisenhower’s full confidence were also important reasons for 
success.  Although the success of future Boards cannot be mandated or legislated, success can be achieved 
based on example.  The Eisenhower Board remains as an example of an effective Board and a model for 
future Boards.
8John F. Kennedy
The failure of the CIA Bay of Pigs covert action operation in April 1961 acted as a catalyst for 
President Kennedy’s decision to re-establish the Board which he did by Executive Order 10938 on May 
4, 1961.  The language of the order was very similar to the executive order issued by Eisenhower, but 
Kennedy’s order re-named the Board the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).  It also 
differed in another respect: Kennedy’s order said the Board members should be appointed by the president 
from “among persons outside Government and on the basis of ability, experience, and knowledge of 
matters relating to the national defense and security.”  Kennedy’s order also stipulated that the Board 
should, in its advisory duties, conduct a “continuing review and assessment of all functions of CIA” and 
other agencies in the intelligence community.  This language authorized the PFIAB to review American 
intelligence activities without having to wait for presidential direction and requests.
Notwithstanding the stipulation in the executive order that members be selected from outside 
government, Kennedy appointed General Maxwell Taylor as a military representative of the president 
with a joint appointment to the PFIAB.  Taylor soon left the PFIAB but was subsequently reappointed 
to concurrent PFIAB and other government duties by President Johnson.  Because the PFIAB and the 
executive order creating it are initiatives of the president, there is no real accountability if or when the 
president decides to violate it by making such concurrent appointments.  Our report, however, highlights 
the problems that such appointments can create, particularly within the government bureaucracy which 
views itself being circumvented by the close personal relationship individual officials may enjoy with the 
president.  This problem was clearly evident during the Johnson Administration when PFIAB Chair Clark 
Clifford simultaneously served in a number of political roles as well.
While the Bay of Pigs certainly provided a catalyst for quickly bringing the PFIAB into being, 
Kennedy clearly intended all along for the PFIAB to act as a key advisor on intelligence matters, especially 
regarding oversight of the intelligence community and covert action.  Indeed, issues involving covert action 
were discussed at twenty-one of the twenty-five PFIAB meetings during Kennedy’s presidency.  This is not 
surprising given that the administration was deeply involved in numerous covert action programs around 
the world at the time, including efforts to overthrow Cuban leader Fidel Castro.  Kennedy also wanted 
scientific talent to strengthen the gathering of hard intelligence and desired that the Board serve as the 
president’s watchdog over the government’s foreign intelligence activities.
It is understandable that intelligence shortcomings in the Bay of Pigs failure spurred Kennedy’s 
interest in receiving continuing advice from the PFIAB, particularly on covert action.  But Kennedy also 
commissioned a separate study of the Bay of Pigs operation by General Maxwell Taylor.  Another example 
of having more than one study conducted of intelligence failures occurred in 1985 when President Reagan 
commissioned a separate study of the Soviet technical penetration of the new American embassy in 
Moscow, in addition to the PFIAB’s review of this same counterintelligence failure.
Kennedy, like Eisenhower, kept his PFIAB small, appointing only seven members initially.  He 
reappointed Killian as chair and added two military officers (James Doolittle and Maxwell Taylor), three 
corporate leaders, and an academic with WWII intelligence experience in the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS). Three of these men – Killian, Doolittle, and William Langer – had previously served on the 
Eisenhower Board.
The PFIAB made recommendations to strengthen the role of the DCI as chief intelligence officer of 
the United States, which pleased the new DCI John McCone who wanted to exercise real management of 
the intelligence community.   With the backing of the president and support from PFIAB recommendations, 
McCone and the Board achieved significant results by harnessing the power of American science and 
technology in support of  American  intelligence needs.  McCone established a Directorate of Research 
in the CIA which became the Directorate of Science and Technology in 1963, and the DIA was created 
in 1961, also as a result of PFIAB urging.  The PFIAB also recommended a new agreement be reached 
between the DCI and the secretary of defense to improve the operation of the important NRO.
The PFIAB played no role during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the defining event of the Cold War.  This 
lack of involvement would also become an enduring characteristic of future Boards which simply do not
9meet often enough to play a role in managing an ongoing crisis.  However, in one of the most important 
reports ever issued by any PFIAB, the Board reviewed the Cuban Missile Crisis and determined that 
there had been insufficient clandestine agent intelligence collection operations in Cuba.  The Board also 
criticized the lack of U-2 flights over Cuba in the six weeks prior to discovering the SS-4 missiles.  While 
the PFIAB concluded that it could not establish the existence of a policy that prevented overflying areas of 
Cuba where surface-to-air missiles were present, it reported that the CIA and others did believe that such 
a restriction prevailed. We know now from a memoir written by Dino Brugioni, a senior NPIC official, 
that this restriction was in fact imposed by senior policy officials at the White House.  But according to the 
Board, the way intelligence indicators were improperly analyzed and reported during the Soviet build-up 
may well be “the most serious flaw in our intelligence system.”  The result was a failed Special National 
Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) that wrongly predicted that the Soviets would not place offensive missiles in 
Cuba.  Once the offensive missiles were discovered, however, the PFIAB said the intelligence community 
performed in an outstanding fashion. 
The Kennedy PFIAB was successful in fulfilling the role for which it was created.  In many 
respects, it followed the example of the Eisenhower Board.  Both presidents had a strong interest in and 
understanding of intelligence.  Kennedy followed Eisenhower’s example by appointing a small Board 
with highly competent members without blatant political cronyism, even reappointing Eisenhower’s chair. 
In the end, Kennedy’s PFIAB submitted a total of 170 recommendations to the president, of which the 
president approved 125, disapproved 2, and deferred action on 43.  The sheer number and wide range of 
serious intelligence issues and problems that were involved clearly suggest that Kennedy’s PFIAB was 
productive and successful.
Lyndon B. Johnson
After Kennedy’s assassination, President Johnson chose to extend Kennedy’s Executive Order 
10938 as the authorizing document for the PFIAB and to keep the same membership.  Clark Clifford 
was then the chair of the eight member Board, having succeeded Killian in April 1963.  Johnson was 
not as intimately associated with the Board as Kennedy.  He attended fewer PFIAB meetings during his 
presidency than Kennedy, who met with the Board at least twelve times.  Johnson preferred a low profile 
Board that would not set off “explosions in the intelligence field, and any resignations in heat by any 
members of the Intelligence Community.”10  Johnson relied more on individual Board members whom he 
would send on missions to different parts of the world.  Chair Clifford met Johnson one-on-one to discuss 
intelligence and domestic political matters for which the president sought his advice.  In effect, he was a 
political advisor as well as PFIAB chair, even participating in Johnson’s successful election campaign in 
1964 and drafting State of the Union speeches.
In his capacity as PFIAB chair, Clifford traveled to Vietnam in 1965 to communicate to personnel 
in the field that the president needed improved intelligence reporting on the situation in Southeast Asia. 
Sixteen recommendations were subsequently made and assigned to various government agencies, but 
Clifford later admitted that these recommendations did not have much effect.  The government bureaucracy 
evidently resented his intrusion into the traditional roles performed by the secretary of state, the DCI, and 
the secretary of defense.  Despite this setback, the breadth of the issues studied by the Johnson PFIAB was 
impressive.  For example, the Board reviewed the audio penetration of the American embassy in Moscow, 
the routing and analysis of intelligence during the Gulf of Tonkin incident, and the Soviet penetration of 
NSA through recruitment of a courier, Sergeant Jack Dunlap.  The Board also studied the Israeli attack 
on USS Liberty in June 1967, the North Korean capture of USS Pueblo in January 1968, the quality of 
intelligence leading up to the Tet Offensive in January 1968, the quality of intelligence prior to the August 
1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and Soviet and Chinese science and technology developments.
10 Memorandum for the File, Board Meeting, October 1-2, 1964, JFK Assassination Record Review Board, PFIAB CD-ROM, P 1.
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PFIAB recommendations led to the creation of the Defense Attaché system in 1964.  As previously 
noted, the Directorate of Science and Technology was created by the DCI within the CIA at the urging 
of the PFIAB.  In response to several PFIAB reports and recommendations, the intelligence community 
began to plan and develop a computer-based system for managing, storing, and disseminating intelligence 
information.  In August 1965, an agreement was finalized on the future management of the NRO which 
outlined the different responsibilities of the secretary of defense and the DCI.  The Board also made 
recommendations to improve intelligence reporting on the Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese leadership, 
and the plans and intentions of the People’s Republic of China in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive. 
Finally, the Board suggested measures to improve U.S. counterintelligence.
The close relationship between President Johnson and PFIAB Chair Clark Clifford was probably 
one reason why the Board took on as many issues as it did and why so many PFIAB recommendations 
were implemented.  Although the Board primarily submitted its reports and communications via the 
national security advisor, Clifford’s access enabled him to go directly to the president.  In 1965, Johnson 
also concurrently appointed Maxwell Taylor to the PFIAB and as his special consultant to the president on 
Vietnam.  The Board’s close relationship with key officials of the U.S. intelligence community also helped 
advance its work.  On the downside, while Johnson utilized the PFIAB, he met with it less often than did 
Eisenhower or Kennedy, and thus began a disconnect between the president and the Board that became 
worse with future presidents.  Johnson also blurred the institutional role of the PFIAB, relying more on his 
personal contacts with many of his individual PFIAB appointees than with the Board as a whole.
Richard M. Nixon
President Nixon issued his Executive Order 11460 on March 20, 1969.  It superseded Kennedy’s 
order, which Johnson had continued.  It generally tasked the PFIAB to advise the president on the overall 
intelligence effort, to conduct a continuing review and assessment of foreign intelligence activities, and 
to report to the president its findings and make recommendations to increase the effectiveness of the 
foreign intelligence effort.  It also directed the DCI and all department heads to cooperate with the Board. 
Separately, one key innovation was to task the Board to provide an annual independent assessment of the 
Soviet nuclear threat as a supplement to the regular assessments made by the intelligence community.  This 
latter requirement is not surprising given Nixon’s service as vice president under Eisenhower during the 
bomber and missile gap scares of the late 1950s.
According to Wheaton Byers, the PFIAB executive secretary from 1973 to 1977, Nixon was initially 
very engaged with the Board and seemed to value its advice.11  In the beginning, Nixon kept the PFIAB 
small, with ten members.  Six of them, including General Taylor as chair, were holdovers from the Johnson 
Board.  Newcomers included Nelson Rockefeller, Admiral George Anderson, Dr. Franklin Murphy and 
attorney Franklin Lincoln.  When Taylor resigned in April 1970, Nixon named Admiral Anderson as the 
new chair and long-time advisor and former Texas Governor John B. Connally to fill Taylor’s vacancy. 
Other appointments included noted nuclear physicist Dr. Edward Teller.  Thus, the Nixon Board had a 
diversity of members in line with previous PFIABs.  
Once the Watergate scandal broke, the president and his staff not surprisingly lost interest 
in independent advisory boards.  On November 9, 1972, four members and the executive secretary of 
the PFIAB submitted their resignations.  Replacements continued to represent persons from a mixture 
of backgrounds, including the private sector, a nuclear weapons expert, a noted economist, former 
Congresswoman and U.S. Ambassador Clare Booth Luce, and future Secretary of State George Shultz. 
Shultz’s appointment in 1974 brought the Board to a total of twelve.
The Nixon Board met two days every other month, in line with previous PFIABs.  They met a 
total of thirty-five times during Nixon’s presidency.  Nixon himself met with the Board eight times in his 
office, though it is unclear how often National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger met with the Board.  A 
majority of the Board’s correspondence and memoranda went to Kissinger who then passed it on to the 
11 Phone interview with authors, May 8, 2006.
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president or other interested parties.  Kissinger wrote to DCI Richard Helms and the secretaries of state 
and defense stating that the PFIAB would review any major change in intelligence community programs 
and capabilities.  But, according to Wheaton Byers, Kissinger kept the Board at arm’s length because it 
was a threat to his own power.  He said that Kissinger often attempted to minimize the Board’s influence. 
There were several times, however, when General Taylor and Admiral Anderson wrote directly to the 
president.  Although most of the reports and recommendations from the PFIAB are still classified, open 
source material does indicate many of the topics studied by the PFIAB.  These issues included the Soviet 
threat, information handling, economic intelligence, and human intelligence. 
Individuals or small groups of PFIAB members often traveled abroad on behalf of the president. 
Nelson Rockefeller traveled to Latin America and conveyed observations and recommendations; four 
other members, including Admiral Anderson, made a fact-finding trip in 1970 to Southeast Asia.  Their 
only known recommendation was to better publicize a program to assist American prisoners of war who 
had escaped or were released.
Nixon’s PFIAB divided itself into a series of panels composed of members with special knowledge 
or experience in a particular field.  There was an information handling panel, a naval panel which had 
the task of advising the president on how to achieve his goal of keeping the U.S. Navy second-to-none, 
a technical panel which addressed topics such as nuclear weapons and intelligence collection, a China 
panel, and a science panel.  This arrangement helped to keep members interested in meetings and topics 
covered.
Notwithstanding the rapid turnover at the DCI level and the growing Watergate scandal, PFIAB 
Chair Admiral Anderson believed that the Board still had a strong relationship with the intelligence 
community.  Records indicate that the DCI and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) attended 
a number of PFIAB meetings, often to give briefings or answer questions.  It appears that the intelligence 
community respected the Board and took its requests seriously.  Thus, even though the president had less 
interest and time to devote to intelligence and there was lack of leadership continuity at the DCI level, 
the PFIAB was able to continue to function because of a continuing cooperative relationship with the 
CIA and the intelligence community.  The PFIAB acquired much of the information on which it based its 
assessment and recommendations from an annual CIA report which the Board requested.  This report was 
a summary of the past year’s events.  It included changes in the CIA’s mission or operating environment, 
major successes and failures over the past twelve months, and agency plans for the future.
The PFIAB made a total of seventy recommendations during Nixon’s presidency which included 
that the government centralize its handling of intelligence information under the DCI, that the president 
oppose 1972 legislation that would require keeping Congress better informed of intelligence issues, that 
better economic intelligence should be collected by foreign service officers and the CIA, that the CIA 
should recruit operations officers with more linguistic and ethnic diversity and leave officers in foreign 
countries longer than a two-year assignment, and that the CIA recommendation to use an electro-optical 
imaging system in American spy satellites be adopted instead of the DOD proposal to continue using film 
cameras.  The president approved the CIA imaging system recommendation after Edwin Land, president 
of Polaroid and a PFIAB member, supported it.
The Nixon PFIAB started out on a path similar to previous Boards.  It continued to study important 
issues and convey useful recommendations, even when Watergate began to affect the president and his 
administration.  Still, it appears that the majority of the studies and recommendations were made before 
the president had to face the full force of the Watergate scandal.  Subsequently, there were indications 
that Nixon sought to politicize the PFIAB by asking its members to speak out publicly on security issues. 
Fortunately, the members refused as it would have certainly called into question the Board’s integrity.
Gerald R. Ford
Gerald Ford took office after Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974.  He continued Nixon’s Executive 
Order 11460 as the mandate for his PFIAB.  He came to depend heavily upon the Board as allegations of 
intelligence improprieties became widespread.  Senator Frank Church (R-ID) led the investigation in the 
Senate and Congressman Otis Pike (D-NY) paralleled the effort in the House.  These efforts eventually led to 
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the establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) in May 1976 and the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in July 1977.  These committees would 
henceforth provide oversight of all U.S. intelligence activities and agencies.  There is some irony in this. 
President Eisenhower initially created his Board to head off congressional oversight of the CIA and the 
intelligence community.
Still, it is remarkable that in the midst of scandal, the PFIAB and its mission as a private advisory 
body to the president survived intact.  It is also interesting that while the House and the Senate created 
permanent committees to conduct continuing and rigorous oversight of the intelligence community, they 
chose not to challenge the established advisory role of the PFIAB.
In the face of congressional investigations, President Ford finally issued Executive Order 11905 
on February 18, 1976, which redefined intelligence operations, banned assassinations, and increased 
oversight activities.  This order included the creation of the new Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) which 
was charged with investigating the legality of intelligence community activities.  The IOB under Ford was 
not a part of the PFIAB, although its three members could also be members of the Board.  The executive 
order kept the duties of the PFIAB the same as under President Nixon.  It was to continue as a part-time 
advisory body of private citizens, responsive to the president alone.  It was not to have a watchdog function 
which was the job of the new IOB.
The initial Ford Board retained eleven Nixon members and then grew to a total of seventeen with 
new appointments even though Admiral Anderson told White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld that he 
thought the ideal Board should be limited to twelve members.  The Board met two days every other month. 
There was no barrier to the chair or a member individually meeting with the president if necessary, but full 
Board meetings with him were rare.  The Board considered topics assigned by the president and continued 
to initiate other projects on its own.  Panels continued to play an important part in the Board’s activities.
Archival research produced no specific PFIAB recommendations, no final reports, and no 
documentation of implementation of recommendations because all of these documents remain classified. 
But we do know the nature and scope of the issues studied by the Board.  These issues included the quality of 
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), the role of economic intelligence, the importance of human intelligence 
(HUMINT) in learning the intentions of foreign governments and leaders, the rise of international terrorism, 
the use of telecommunications for intelligence purposes, postmortem investigations, and projecting future 
technological needs.
In contrast to previous Boards, the Ford PFIAB focused less on technology and its intelligence 
uses and more on the analysis of foreign states’ intentions and various political and economic issues. 
This gradual shift was marked by the Team A – Team B exercise of 1976-1977.  As a result of the PFIAB 
dissatisfaction with the quality of a specific NIE on the Soviet Union, newly appointed DCI George H.W. 
Bush agreed in May 1976 to a competitive analysis of Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions.
Under this experiment, the Board and the CIA agreed to create a CIA team (A) and a team of 
non-government experts (B) to examine the Soviet threat in three areas: low altitude air defense, ICBM 
accuracy, and overall Soviet strategic objectives.  Team B took a hard-line stance on the USSR’s intentions 
and capabilities and concluded that the CIA had consistently underestimated Soviet capabilities and 
objectives.
The Team B portion of the exercise undermined CIA morale as it seemed to many in the intelligence 
community to be a blatantly political exercise.  Indeed, the leaks of the Team B analysis angered DCI Bush, 
and accusations flew that the PFIAB was the source of the leaks.  The DCI later told an NSC meeting that 
the competitive analysis seemed like a good idea at the time, but that he did not think it would go public. 
As a result he felt that he had been “had” and recommended that the competitive analysis program not be 
institutionalized. No doubt, this experience colored Bush’s view of the PFIAB and most likely increased 
his reluctance to form the Board early in his own presidential term.
 The broad scope of the issues studied by the PFIAB is further illustrated by the questions that the 
Board answered for the president in its annual year end report meeting held October 7-8, 1976.  These 
questions included identifying future major intelligence requirements of policy makers out to 1985, 
determining what the intelligence community needed to do to respond to policy maker requirements, 
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proposing what major conceptual and technological innovations were likely to emerge or might be invented 
during this period, prioritizing what research and development (R & D) efforts the United States needed to 
pursue given current intelligence needs and requirements, identifying regions of instability, and pushing 
to expand open diplomatic and scientific collection of information.  In addition, the Board advised the 
president on whether he should claim executive privilege in the case of AT&T cooperation with the NSA 
and the FBI in domestic surveillance operations.  The Board also reviewed the operation by the Glomar 
Explorer expedition to salvage a sunken Soviet Golf-II class submarine in the Pacific Ocean. Finally, the 
Board studied improving HUMINT and concluded that identifying necessary reforms was too large a task 
for it to undertake effectively.
Outgoing DCI Bush offered his assessment of the PFIAB during the Ford Administration in a letter 
he wrote to Cherne dated January 17, 1977.  In it, he expressed his appreciation for the work done by the 
PFIAB and endorsed its continuation.  Bush concluded that “we wrestled with new problems and new 
threats to our ability to fulfill our mission.  The Board’s contribution to these activities, through its advice 
to me and its recommendations to the President, has been significant.”12
Jimmy Carter
President Carter abolished the PFIAB with his Executive Order 11984 on May 4, 1977, but he 
decided that the IOB would be retained with new members.  A number of factors apparently influenced 
this decision.  Carter’s DCI, Stansfield Turner, explained that if Carter had kept the PFIAB, its membership 
would have had to be completely changed as Turner thought the Ford Board was too right wing and would 
not work well with a Democrat president.  To replace the Ford members completely would have been too 
cumbersome a task.  
Carter did not have strong feelings on the matter.  According to Turner, the president left the decision 
to him as the new DCI.  Turner did not believe he needed a Board that might interfere in his domain. 
Furthermore, the CIA scandals of the 1970s had led to the creation of the Senate and House intelligence 
committees.  Turner said that he saw no need for the PFIAB since he had both the SSCI and the HPSCI 
overseeing him. The Carter Administration, therefore, concluded that there was sufficient oversight and 
that the PFIAB was just another bureaucratic layer.  In addition, Carter believed that the overhauled NSC 
could handle the tasks of the PFIAB.13  Of course, this reflects a misunderstanding of the PFIAB as it was 
never intended to oversee the DCI.  The PFIAB was a part-time advisory body to the president, and it was 
to the president, and not the DCI, that the Board reported.  A Carter White House transition study project 
noted that if the president decided later that he needed such a Board, it could be reconstituted quickly.
Indeed, in the wake of the Iranian take-over of the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November 1979, 
the Carter Administration explored the possibility of re-establishing the Board as an independent entity 
to examine the chain of events that had led to the hostage ordeal.  National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski reportedly approached former Ford PFIAB Chair Leo Cherne late in the Carter Administration 
about reconstituting the PFIAB after the failed attempt to rescue American hostages in Tehran.  Carter’s 
change of heart about the PFIAB was motivated by the desire to deflect congressional action after the 
failed rescue operation. In the end, Carter decided to postpone any action until after the 1980 election.  In 
any case, Cherne declined and Carter was defeated in 1980 by Ronald Reagan.
Ronald Reagan
President Reagan re-established the PFIAB by Executive Order 12331 on October 20, 1981.  During 
the presidential campaign in an effort to portray Carter’s foreign policy as weak, Reagan had criticized 
Carter for not having a PFIAB. Reagan’s attack appears to have been more a political ploy than a serious 
policy position given that it took Reagan almost a year in office before he created his PFIAB.
12 Letter from DCI Bush to Leo Cherne, January 17, 1977, Folder “PFIAB Termination (1)”, Box 6, Leo Cherne Papers, Gerald 
R. Ford Library.
13 Turner interview, June 2, 2006.
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Part of the delay was the result of an internal debate over who should serve as chair of the Board: 
Leo Cherne or Anne Armstrong.  Cherne was a long-time member who well understood the PFIAB’s 
role.  Armstrong, a stalwart of Republican politics, was regarded as a novice to the world of intelligence. 
Armstrong eventually became chair and Cherne served as the vice chair.
The idea to reestablish the Board had support from several key individuals in his new administration 
including Reagan’s first National Security Advisor Richard Allen and William Casey who was Reagan’s 
campaign manager and subsequently his first DCI.  The PFIAB was authorized to review all American 
intelligence organizations and was required to report at least twice a year on its findings.  Reagan’s executive 
order also specified which agencies and persons could request input from the PFIAB; these included the 
CIA and the DCI.
Reagan initially appointed nineteen persons to his PFIAB, many more than the usual ten to twelve 
of previous Boards.  It was apparent that this Board would be more political than previous PFIABs, 
but it did have some members with extensive experience in intelligence and national security.  These 
included former Nixon and Ford PFIAB members such as Cherne.  Political appointees included Alfred 
Bloomingdale, Frank Borman, and Tom Moorer who had little experience with, or substantive knowledge 
of, intelligence.  The Board expanded its membership considerably, reaching twenty-one members at one 
point and, thus, making the Board unwieldy.  Compounding this problem was the fact that many appointees 
did not possess any obvious qualifications for membership.  Indeed, under Reagan, membership on the 
Board was initially treated as a political plum which Reagan gave friends and loyal political supporters.
Despite this inauspicious beginning, Armstrong eventually proved to be an effective chair.  At one 
point, she threatened to resign if a certain purely political appointment was made.  Ultimately, the individual 
was not appointed.  Armstrong extended her influence to be able to influence the appointments of other 
members and had a say in up to six of them.  Armstrong thought that the initial Board was too large and 
used her access to convince Reagan and National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane to reduce the size 
of the Board from twenty-one members down to ten.  The eleven members cut received their termination 
letters on November 1, 1985, in what was referred to as the “Halloween Massacre.”  Two weeks later, new 
appointments brought the total back up to fourteen.  The new members were more qualified than some 
earlier appointments, and the Board was leaner and more effective after the reduction.  In January 1988, 
Reagan issued Executive Order 12624 which authorized expansion of the Board to sixteen members, the 
number it remained at for the rest of his presidency.  Most members were prominent individuals with a 
wide variety of experience that contributed to the PFIAB’s advisory role.  There remained, however, several 
who apparently were appointed primarily by virtue of their friendship with the president.  According to 
CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Gates, Armstrong did a good job of managing such a large 
two-tiered Board of experts and political appointees.14
There are conflicting opinions about DCI Casey’s attitude toward the PFIAB.  Some thought that 
Casey’s secretive nature would lead him to try to keep the Board, along with everyone else, uninformed 
about CIA activities.  But according to Gates, Casey embraced the Board.  Casey supported the Board’s 
reestablishment and also had friends on the Board, such as his long-term collaborator Vice Chair Cherne. 
From time to time, Casey may have had a “mind your own business” attitude, but this was his view of 
anyone who tried to interfere with his activities as DCI.
The Board met every other month for two days at the White House.  The Board also traveled and 
held meetings and briefings in locations such as the Strategic Air Command and Silicon Valley.  The 
DCI routinely briefed the PFIAB at every meeting.  Usually the PFIAB raised issues to be studied, but 
occasionally the president and the national security advisor would assign them.  DCI Casey also regularly 
consulted with the Board about issues he thought it should pursue.
 President Reagan never attended a formal meeting of the PFIAB.  On numerous occasions, however, 
individual Board members did meet with the president in the White House to discuss their studies and 
their recommendations.  According to records kept by Cherne, during his first term, Reagan met perhaps 
more frequently with PFIAB members but for shorter periods of time than some of his predecessors. 
14 Gates interview, April 12, 2006.
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Vice President Bush attended at least one meeting of the Board in 1984.  Normally, the PFIAB would send 
its written reports to the NSC for review by the national security advisor, before going to the president.
Armstrong established a set of subcommittees, and under her leadership, the PFIAB itself initiated 
many of the investigations and studies it undertook.  One such issue was the discovery in 1985 that the 
new American embassy under construction in Moscow was full of listening devices placed by Soviet 
construction workers.  In its 1987 report, the PFIAB recommended spending $79 million to use advanced 
technology to purge the new embassy of these devices.  It also recommended transferring embassy security 
from the State Department to a new agency reporting to the secretary of state.  Reagan, however, appointed 
a second outside panel of experts headed by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to study the 
problem, and they recommended destroying the top three floors of the new embassy and rebuilding them 
while constructing a brand new six-story building to house sensitive operations.  Ultimately, the Reagan 
Administration implemented neither recommendation.  The Clinton Administration later decided to follow 
the advice of the Schlesinger panel to destroy and rebuild the bugged floors.
The PFIAB also investigated the 1985 defection and re-defection of Soviet KGB officer Vitaly 
Yurchenko.  In its 1987 report, the Board criticized the CIA’s handling of the defection.  Also in 1985, nine 
U.S. individuals were arrested for conducting espionage against the United States.  Six had been espionage 
agents working for the Soviet Union, one had spied for Communist China, one had been an agent for 
Israel, and another had provided information to the Ghanaian government.  Finally, the Board examined 
the defection to the Soviet Union of CIA officer Edward Lee Howard.  In all these cases, the PFIAB made 
recommendations for improving procedures at the CIA and the FBI.  
The Board also dealt with numerous issues of economic intelligence.  Under Cherne’s guidance, 
the adequacy of intelligence on the issue of strategic resources was the primary focus of the Board’s 
investigation.  The Board likewise looked at the intelligence side of the Strategic Defense Initiative and the 
possible military applications of the space shuttle, concluding that it had very little potential for military 
uses.  The Board also spent considerable time and effort assessing other issues, including the state of 
the Soviet economy, the legitimacy of new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms, Soviet plans and 
intentions concerning the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), assessment of Soviet fears that the 
U.S. was planning a nuclear first strike against the USSR, the security of U.S. government communications 
in Washington, D.C., leaks of classified information, the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II, the 
need for super computers in the U.S. government, the military’s lack of tactical intelligence during the 
invasion of Grenada in 1983, and the counterintelligence problem of Cuban double agents.
Most of the actual PFIAB reports and recommendations remain classified.  However, from the 
unclassified information accessible and from the wide array of intelligence issues that the Board studied, 
the Reagan PFIAB was clearly a success after the reorganization of the Board in the second term. 
According to the assessment of senior officials we interviewed, from the reports and recommendations 
available and from the number and variety of issues tackled, clearly the PFIAB performed an important 
function. No other advisory panel in the government had such a wide variety of independent, objective, 
non-bureaucratic, and mostly non-partisan expertise which it could apply to the intelligence problems that 
surfaced during the Reagan presidency.
George H.W. Bush
President George H.W. Bush was not favorably disposed towards the PFIAB. Thus, the Board lay 
dormant for the first eighteen months of his presidency.  Bush made no changes to the Reagan-appointed 
Board, issued no new executive order, and the staff continued its work only on projects launched during 
the Reagan Administration.  There is no evidence of meetings or any new taskings.  Subsequently, Bush 
trimmed the Board’s membership to six but still did not regard it as a major part of his intelligence or 
national security policy team.
 Some of Bush’s apparently negative attitude toward the PFIAB can be attributed to his experiences 
as DCI under President Ford.  As DCI, Bush had agreed to the PFIAB idea of outside experts known as 
Team B analyzing Soviet military capabilities, but the leaking of the study to the press angered him.  As vice 
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president, Bush also saw what he regarded as meddling by the Board in the START negotiations.  Bush, 
who preferred to work with a small group of trusted individuals, may also have regarded the PFIAB as 
a threat to the secrecy that is possible when working with a small trusted group.  To prevent leaks in his 
own administration, Bush was prone to omit the Board from important discussions.  In addition, Bush’s 
own experience in foreign affairs, his close relationship with his Secretary of State James Baker, and 
his reliance on National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft made reliance on an outside advisory board 
unnecessary. A former cabinet official, reflecting upon his long service in various positions in a number 
of different administrations, told us that he thought the PFIAB was not of much use except as a place to 
appoint people as a political reward.  He said that he did not know of a single example of the PFIAB doing 
anything that improved U.S. intelligence.  He further said that there were already too many overlapping 
organizations in American intelligence.  Other senior members of President Bush’s new administration 
also were skeptical of the Board.
Much like Eisenhower, though, Bush may have been forced to reconstitute the Board because of 
pressure from Congress.  Senator David Boren (D-OK), in particular, as chair of the Senate intelligence 
committee, sought to exercise greater congressional oversight of intelligence.  Putting the PFIAB in place 
signaled the administration’s willingness to monitor itself.  One former member recalls that Senator Boren 
told President Bush that the SSCI would push for legislation requiring a PFIAB if Bush did not appoint 
one himself.  Former PFIAB Chair Anne Armstrong and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft also 
reportedly helped to persuade the president not to abolish it.  Former DCI Gates recalls that Bush was 
told it was important to keep the Board, but to reconstitute it along the Eisenhower model of only four to 
six members, and heavily skewed toward individuals with scientific and technical backgrounds.  Using 
the existing Reagan executive order, in June 1990 President Bush restructured the Board by reducing it to 
six members who were experts in science, intelligence, and foreign policy issues.  Of the fifteen members 
of the Reagan Board, only one remained after the restructuring.  In addition to keeping the membership 
small, Bush reduced the scope of the Board’s work.
After the first Gulf War, this new Board undertook an influential study of the uses of intelligence 
in battlefield conditions which helped to strengthen the cooperation of the intelligence agencies and helped 
to more clearly identify intelligence needs.  Still, on significant issues such as reform of the CIA and the 
intelligence community, President Bush chose not to use the PFIAB, but to rely instead upon his NSC and the 
DCI.  It is striking how many intelligence issues were reviewed during the administration by entities other than 
the PFIAB.  For instance, an agenda for intelligence reform was drafted by Robert Gates while he was deputy 
national security advisor and implemented by him when he became DCI with apparently no PFIAB input.15
William J. Clinton
President Clinton issued a new Executive Order 12863 which authorized a PFIAB membership 
of up to sixteen persons.  He reportedly wanted an expanded Board, in excess of the number previously 
thought to be manageable by earlier presidents and Board chairs, to help accommodate the placement of 
political appointments such as Zoe Baird, his failed nominee for attorney general.  PFIAB members were 
also limited to serving two-year terms, presumably to insure that there would be regular vacancies to use 
as a political reward.
Clinton also made the IOB a standing committee of the PFIAB.  All IOB members would be 
PFIAB members, and the chair of the IOB would be selected by the PFIAB chair.  Thus, even the IOB 
would be run by people politically loyal to President Clinton.  One example was John Shelby Bryan, 
a wealthy Board member from 1999-2001.  Throughout the 1990s, Bryan acted as one of the chief 
fund-raisers for Clinton’s presidential campaigns.
Under Clinton, the PFIAB met every six weeks, completing much of its work outside of formal 
meetings.  From 1993 to 2001, the Board reportedly produced eighty-five reports at the request of the 
president or National Security Advisors Anthony Lake or Samuel Berger.
15 Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community 1946-2005 
(Washington, DC: CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), 196-203.
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Under Clinton the PFIAB conducted a study of the security breaches at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory.  After the case of Taiwan-born nuclear scientist Wen Ho Lee, accused of stealing secrets from 
the lab for China, was publicized in the media in 1999, Clinton asked the PFIAB to investigate security 
at the nation’s national laboratories.  This investigation uncovered a twenty-year history of security and 
counterintelligence problems at the Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories.  The PFIAB report 
identified numerous causes for chronic security and counterintelligence problems and was highly critical of 
the government’s security measures at the weapons lab.  In the end, the PFIAB DOE report restructured the 
national nuclear strategy, safeguard protocols, nonproliferation, and research and development efforts. 
Moreover, under Clinton the IOB also conducted a public investigation of CIA activities in 
Guatemala regarding alleged CIA involvement in the 1990 death of an American citizen and the 
disappearance of a Guatemalan guerrilla leader in 1992.  The IOB also requested the CIA inspector general 
to investigate all clandestine assets in Guatemala since 1984 for alleged human rights abuses.  The IOB 
found no indication that U.S. government officials were involved in or knew about the disappearance, 
torture, or death of U.S. or Guatemalan citizens.  But the review changed the intelligence community’s 
asset validation system and the manner in which the CIA handled liaison services with suspected human 
rights abuses.
Unlike previous PFIAB investigations, the DOE and Guatemala reports were published in 
unclassified format.  In the view of a former congressional staffer, the reason Clinton wanted both of 
these investigations to be conducted in public was to show how the problems involved pre-dated his 
administration.  In so doing, Clinton hoped to inoculate himself from any possible negative political 
backlash based on these incidents.
Finally, several of the key players on the Aspin-Brown Commission on the Roles and Capabilities 
of the U.S. Intelligence Community — Les Aspin, Warren Rudman, Lew Allen, Zoe Baird, Stephen 
Friedman, Robert Hermann — were PFIAB members.  The commission was set up by Congress in 1994 
in an effort to review the American intelligence community in the wake of the end of the Cold War. 
Among its key findings, the commission encouraged closer cooperation among the various components 
of the intelligence community and deflected growing sentiment in Congress to disband the CIA in the 
aftermath of the Aldrich Ames spy scandal.  This panel was one of the most public and closely watched 
Board activities in its entire history.  While PFIAB member Maurice Sonnenberg lamented that “Clinton 
didn’t listen to the PFIAB,” Vice President Al Gore, National Security Advisor Tony Lake, and DCI John 
Deutch did.16  So it is fair to say that the PFIAB — via Aspin-Brown — had some influence on the Clinton 
Administration during the mid-1990s.
Clinton’s Board was a hybrid political-expert creation, according to a former Clinton-era 
senior official we interviewed.  The public nature of the Guatemalan and National Laboratory security 
investigations suggests that Clinton, while concerned with substantive matters covered in the investigations, 
was just as interested in using his PFIAB as political cover for dealing with sensitive political issues. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that it took congressional intervention – in the form of the 
Aspin-Brown Commission – to get Clinton’s PFIAB involved with substantive intelligence reform issues.
George W. Bush
President George W. Bush did not issue a new executive order reconstituting the PFIAB upon 
taking office, but rather he relied upon Clinton’s Executive Order 12863.  He did, however, amend that 
executive order twice.  President Bush’s May 14, 2003, amendment in Executive Order 13301 simply 
expanded the maximum possible membership of the IOB from four under Clinton to five.  On April 
13, 2005, Bush further amended the basic Clinton executive order with Executive Order 13376 which 
replaced all references to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) with the new title Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI).
During Bush’s first term, the PFIAB met only once with the president at its initial formal meeting. 
The Board’s chair, former national security advisor to the first President Bush, Brent Scowcroft, was 
16 Loch K. Johnson, “The Aspin-Brown Intelligence Inquiry:  Behind the Closed Doors of a Blue Ribbon Commission,” 
Studies in Intelligence, 48, no. 3 (accessed October 22, 2006).
18
removed as chair at the start of the second term, likely the result of his public questioning of the 
administration’s Iraq strategy.
In Bush’s second term, the PFIAB took on a new life, largely due to the major effort at intelligence 
reorganization that took place.  The new DNI John Negroponte met at least once with the Board and made 
it a habit to have periodic informal conversations with Board Chair Stephen Friedman.  The staff grew 
from the customary three to four to approximately eight to ten, and the Board now reportedly meets on a 
monthly basis.  The chair also now briefs the president verbally on a monthly basis.  The Board has been 
interested in intelligence community-wide issues, with a particular focus on human intelligence, in an 
effort to help meet the president’s goal of increasing this capability by fifty percent.  The Board has also 
been studying the administrative structure of the intelligence community.
Former Secretary of Commerce and PFIAB member Don Evans reportedly played a key role in 
having CIA Director Porter Goss removed.  A consensus developed on the Board regarding what was 
perceived as the poor performance of Goss.  Goss’s brief tenure was marked by declining morale and bad 
management.  Evans, a close personal friend of Bush, brought these concerns to the president’s attention. 
While the personal relationship Evans enjoyed with Bush undoubtedly was a key factor in the success of 
his intervention, Evans would not have had the opportunity nor the credibility to weigh in on this issue 
if he were not associated with the PFIAB.  Clearly, the Goss case reaffirmed the importance of both the 
PFIAB and of members’ personal relationships with the president.
In the final year of his presidency, Bush issued an executive order on February 29, 2008, 
establishing a reorganized PFIAB.  In it, he renamed the Board for the first time since the Kennedy 
Administration.  The newly christened President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) has an upper 
limit of sixteen members and takes into account the importance of domestic intelligence with regard 
to the new threat environment.  Members of the PIAB cannot be currently employed with the federal 
government and, as has been traditional, receive no compensation save for per diem and travel expenses. 
The IOB remains in existence.  The president appoints the executive director of the PIAB who can, at 
the president’s desire, serve in the same capacity on the IOB.  The new order also directs the PIAB to 
report its findings to the president and other appropriate intelligence community members (such as the 
DNI) twice a year and directs the DNI and other department heads to render any necessary information 
and assistance to the PIAB.
In our preliminary judgment, the George W. Bush Administration’s record with the PFIAB is 
mixed.  In the first term, it appears that as the result of the disagreement between PFIAB Chair Brent 
Scowcroft and the president and other senior officials over the wisdom of the 2003 Iraq war, the PFIAB 
was hardly consulted at all.  How much this under-utilization of the Board contributed to the intelligence 
failures of the time is uncertain, but one can argue with hindsight that had the Board been more actively 
involved in advising the Bush Administration about intelligence issues, some of the policy failures could 
have been avoided.  Conversely, there is much evidence that in Bush’s second term, the PFIAB has played 
a much more active role in advising President Bush on a wide variety of issues concerning the ongoing 
reform of the intelligence community in the wake of 9/11 and the Iraq war.  This follows a general pattern 
we have seen of some presidents belatedly discovering that the PFIAB is an important source of intelligence 
advice.
Recommendations
In our judgment, the PFIAB’s strengths far outweigh its weaknesses.  The weaknesses themselves, 
moreover, can easily be rectified to structure a more effective Board.  The PFIAB is a unique presidential 
asset that, if properly utilized, could help to identify and meet the intelligence challenges that future 
presidents will invariably encounter.  The president needs to have a body that he can rely on to provide 
advice and guidance on intelligence issues, aside from the intelligence community or the congressional 
oversight committees.
Only the PFIAB can get the attention of the president, has good access to the president, can leverage 
the president’s authority against the rest of the federal bureaucracy, can operate in a confidential manner 
outside the glare of public scrutiny, and does not have any institutional interests to protect.
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The fact that each president since Eisenhower, save Carter, has created a PFIAB underscores the 
value that most administrations attribute to such an independent intelligence advisory body.  Even Carter 
belatedly realized the need for such an organization at the end of his administration.  Various studies, 
beginning with the 1975 Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign 
Policy (the Murphy Commission), have also highlighted the value of the PFIAB and its important role as 
an independent source of advice for the president on intelligence issues.  The Boards have provided useful 
reports and analyses on topics ranging from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the security leaks at Los Alamos 
that have helped identify weak procedures or methods in the intelligence community.  
In our view, the PFIAB has been least effective when it was involved in resource issues or in 
ongoing day-to-day operational or crisis issues, such as the first bombing of the World Trade Center. 
Conversely, the PFIAB has been at its best when it looks ahead, anticipating future technological trends 
or political developments.  The PFIAB should be able to take the initiative and send suggestions to the 
president and the NSC for the improvement of intelligence policies or activities.  It also should be able to 
provide early warnings, serving in the words of one senior official we interviewed as “a canary in the coal 
mine” for the president and the intelligence community.
Have all the recommendations of the Boards been accepted or taken into account?  The obvious 
answer is no.  Nevertheless, the PFIAB has served not only as an in-house think tank but also as a kitchen 
cabinet.  In this role, the PFIAB serves to lay the groundwork for serious discussion of various issues. 
For example, in 1976 the Board examined the problem of international terrorism.  The topics it examined 
– non-state and state actors, possible theft of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and the 
threat of terrorism to U.S. interests – foreshadowed many of the issues that burst onto the national agenda 
in the wake of 9/11.
Future administrations can take a number of steps to strengthen the PFIAB.  Our specific 
recommendations derive from two sources: the views expressed by those officials, past and present, who 
were involved with the PFIAB and our own analysis of the historical record of the Board’s contributions. 
Our recommendations are offered with an eye toward strengthening the role of intelligence and to help 
future presidents use the PFIAB more effectively.
There are seven areas in which the PFIAB can be helpful:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Our specific recommendations to help the PFIAB live up to its full potential are divided into 
three categories: the internal organization of the PFIAB, how the PFIAB should interact with the greater 
intelligence community, and finally, the role of the president and White House in helping the PFIAB carry 
out its intended role.
Organizational
Name
One of the problems that the PFIAB faces involves  the name of the organization.  With the changing 
nature of intelligence in the wake of 9/11, the distinction between foreign and domestic intelligence has 
become blurred.  For instance, the Bush Administration’s domestic phone tapping is viewed as a foreign 
It can help determine whether intelligence is being used properly.
It can help ensure that the intelligence collection and assessment process is devoid of any 
bureaucratic pressures or interests.
It can ascertain whether or not tasking of the intelligence community is proper and being carried 
out effectively.
It can assess whether or not the intelligence community is properly organized.
It can review past intelligence issues to learn lessons from successes and failures.
It can identify potential challenges facing the United States, laying the groundwork for 
intelligence community planning.
Finally, it can help policy makers think about the implications for intelligence collection and 
analysis of new technologies and modes of organization employed outside the intelligence 
community.
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intelligence activity but also has domestic legal repercussions.  In that environment, the adjective “foreign” 
probably needed to be changed, as the Bush Administration has recently done by removing it from the 
official title of the Board.  Another shortcoming the Board faces is its designation as an “advisory” 
board. The term “advisory” is limiting, suggesting the non-binding nature of the Board’s work and 
recommendations. While the Board ought not to be given decision-making or operational authority which 
would undermine the nature of the Board, its position needs to be strengthened vis-à-vis the rest of the 
intelligence community.  It is our recommendation that the Board be renamed the President’s National 
Intelligence Board (PNIB).
Members
The president needs to resist the temptation to make appointments to the Board simply as a payoff to 
political supporters.  Historically, the most successful Boards have contained scientists and other technical 
specialists (Edwin Land and William O. Baker), general foreign affairs specialists (William Hyland and 
Henry Kissinger), experts from outside government in business and academia (Stephen Friedman and 
William Langer), and distinguished political figures (Clare Booth Luce and Anne Armstrong). Members 
of the Board should have a wide range or mix of backgrounds, but there must be several with extensive 
in-depth knowledge of the American intelligence community.  Other members should have extensive 
technical and scientific, academic, foreign policy, or military backgrounds.  Two to three members of the 
Board should be career intelligence officers (Admiral Bobby Inman and General Lew Allen).
A particularly important position on the Board is the chair.  The president needs to select a chair 
in whom he has confidence and trust.  Ideally, the chair should live in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan 
area to provide ready access to the president and the intelligence community.  Not only should the chair be 
an expert in intelligence matters, but he or she should also have the flexibility to participate in the regular 
bi-monthly meetings of the full Board.  The PFIAB can be most effective if it has an activist chair – someone 
who organizes effectively, demonstrates leadership ability, knows how to run a meeting, commands respect, 
and speaks with authority.  An executive secretary should be appointed who understands intelligence and 
who can work well with persons in the intelligence community.
Five specific recommendations should be considered:
•
•
•
•
Two-year term limits should be established with no reappointments.  The term limit is to 
ensure a rotation of members, thus guaranteeing that the Board will also have a fresh outlook 
or approach.
Thought should be given to providing the members of the Senate intelligence committee with 
courtesy notification of prospective appointments to the Board.  Knowing that the Congress 
is watching more closely may help prevent the PFIAB from becoming a political dumping 
ground for the president’s friends and political supporters  who have no other qualifications 
for membership. The Senate notification process will also raise the visibility and importance 
of the PFIAB in the eyes of the administration, the intelligence community, and the public. 
Such a step ensures that candidates have the requisite qualifications for service and can pass 
the scrutiny of the Senate and public.  Senate notifications can be arranged in a manner that 
would not undermine presidential prerogatives or executive privilege.  The Senate intelligence 
committee can meet with appointees, but this would not be equivalent to Senate confirmation. 
Another possible approach might involve the administration providing the names of prospective 
Board members to the committee in a courtesy written communication.
A procedure needs to be established that defines criteria for selection in order to protect the 
selection process as much as possible from political needs and cronyism.  Certain standards 
should always be adhered to: the Board should be bipartisan and reflect certain expertise in the 
six areas of technology, defense, national security, intelligence, management, and economics; 
members should also be drawn from the private sector and the ranks of past practitioners.  This 
diversity will guarantee a good cross section of bipartisan experts. 
Membership should be fixed.  In the first years of existence, the PFIAB appears to have 
operated efficiently with eight members.  PFIAB membership has ranged from a low of six
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•
These five points should be institutionalized in the next president’s PFIAB, thus establishing a 
precedent to which future presidents will be expected to adhere.
Organization
Part of the problem the PFIAB faces is that its membership is part-time and cannot devote its full 
attention to issues.  Currently, it meets for two days every month.  Policy formation and crisis management, 
however, take place 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.  In addition, while it is important to have highly qualified, 
expert members, this criterion carries with it some risks.  Highly qualified members usually lead active 
and busy public lives that, along with the limited number of Board meetings, further truncate the amount 
of time that they can devote to Board business.  It may be advisable, therefore, to create an executive 
committee consisting of the chair and two other members that can assemble as quickly as necessary.
The Board should continue to use small panels to focus on specific issues.  These panels could be 
composed of members, staff, or outside consultants depending on the issue being studied or reviewed. This 
organization will allow the Board to stay current with pressing issues.  In extraordinary circumstances, the 
Board must have the ability to shift into a full-time mode, if only with a few Board members, staffers, and 
consultants working on a panel devoted to studying a critical and timely intelligence issue.  In addition, 
the chair or members of the PFIAB, at the discretion of the president, should be included in any NSC 
meetings, not to assume an operational role in crisis management, but rather to help the Board better 
understand the nature and dynamics of future such crises.  In this manner, the PFIAB will have direct 
knowledge of a situation, and the advisory role of the Board and the chair, in particular, can be more 
effective and timely. 
Finally, the PFIAB should create a permanent Science Committee that can focus on application 
of science and technology to intelligence needs.  Such a body could provide guidance to efforts like the 
CIA-backed not-for-profit firm In-Q-Tel that invests in companies that may provide future technologies of 
use to the intelligence community.  This proposed Science Committee should have experts assigned to it 
from various government agencies who can meet on a regular basis to monitor technological changes in 
both intelligence collection and analysis.  The committee should also issue a report regarding the progress 
of science in the field of intelligence.  This report would be shared with the intelligence community. 
Technology is an important part of intelligence, but the current approach is too often ad hoc and prevents 
a detailed long-range examination.
Staff
The Board’s staff has been insufficient.  An executive director and two or three staffers do not give 
the PFIAB the resources to stay fully current with events and to maintain a sufficient database.  The current 
Bush Administration’s PFIAB staff of eight to ten is a step in the right direction.  While the PFIAB can 
in George H.W. Bush’s Administration to a high of twenty-one under Ronald Reagan.  The 
Board should not exceed ten members.  Ten is large enough to ensure broad expertise on the 
Board but small enough to keep it manageable.  A larger Board becomes unwieldy, preventing 
careful examination of issues.  A smaller Board facilitates a certain comfort level among the 
members that can aid in the Board’s functioning. 
The president should avoid appointing members who also concurrently have other management 
or staff jobs in the president’s administration. Appointing individuals to the PFIAB who have 
concurrent jobs inside the government has led the PFIAB to become involved in ongoing 
day-to-day operational or crisis issues and situations.  Avoiding such involvement was a 
recommendation made to us by virtually every former official whom we interviewed.  If the 
chair or other Board members concurrently serve in other government positions, there exists 
a risk that those members would view intelligence issues through the lens of the political 
interests of the administration. It might also lead them to represent the bureaucratic interests 
of some department or agency and thereby tarnish the public’s image of the Board as an 
independent advisory body.
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draw on the personnel and resources of other agencies, this is a poor substitute for a permanent staff 
that can enhance the Board’s institutional memory and independence from bureaucratic influences.  The 
PFIAB needs to have a core of employees hired by and working solely for the PFIAB.  The Board also 
needs to have an independent budget.  About half of the PFIAB’s staff should be career intelligence, 
homeland security, or law enforcement officers.  We agree with one former chair’s recommendation that 
these staffers ought to leave their home agencies and NOT return after PFIAB assignment.  Additionally, 
outside consultants remain an important talent pool to draw upon to provide needed expertise for specific 
studies or reviews.
Orientation Training
In addition to appointing knowledgeable members, new members need some form of systematic 
orientation.  Newly appointed members already receive briefings about the intelligence community and 
the role of the PFIAB.  These briefings are conducted by the PFIAB staff and members of the various 
intelligence agencies.  A more formal introduction may be necessary.  This introduction should include 
briefings regarding legal issues, activities of past Boards, and site visits.  An introduction to the greater 
intelligence community, as well as formal functional and geographic briefings on world issues, would also 
help new members become more productive members of the president’s team.
IOB
The IOB should be abolished.  Given the oversight roles of the statutory inspectors general and 
the House and Senate intelligence committees, the IOB is duplicative.  Moreover, since IOB members 
have been members of the PFIAB, there may be temptation to draw the PFIAB into backward looking 
assessments and operational matters.  Eliminating the IOB will help strengthen the PFIAB.
Functional
Feedback
The work of the Board can be enhanced by establishing a more formal follow-up procedure.  The 
PFIAB has demonstrated that it can produce helpful studies and recommendations.  A shortcoming in 
this process is the lack of consistent feedback.  The Board has no regular way of gauging the impact of its 
reports.  A mechanism needs to be put in place whereby members or the president can be briefed regarding 
the impact of any report the Board issues.  This can be done either by a regular inter-agency review process 
or through an individual report by the agency in question.
Annual Report
The PFIAB should issue its own annual report on intelligence.  The report would examine the 
strengths and weaknesses of the intelligence community and suggest future goals.  The Board is in a good 
position to play this critical role.  It has no institutional or bureaucratic turf to protect.  Thus, it provides an 
excellent means for an effective review of intelligence-related legislation, proposed intelligence directives, 
and other new initiatives in the intelligence community.  In addition, the proposed PFIAB annual report 
ought to look ahead to identify key trends in technology or new modes of organization that might affect 
intelligence collection and analysis in the years to come.
Community Use
The Board also can serve as a sounding board for estimating the usefulness of potential initiatives 
by individual intelligence agencies.  The PFIAB should take the pulse of the intelligence community in 
order to warn the White House of impending problems or issues.  It may be beneficial for these agencies 
to submit their plans to the Board for an impartial review before implementation.  To fulfill that role, the 
PFIAB must maintain extensive informal contact with the components of the intelligence community, such 
as the CIA and the DIA.  In the words of one former senior official we spoke with, the PFIAB needs to be 
“a knowledgeable pain in the ass.”
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Role of the President and the White House
Timing
The president should name a Board early, possibly even during the transition phase of a new 
administration, to underscore for the intelligence community the importance the president attaches to the 
Board.  It will also put in place a functioning body that can help frame and assess the president’s policy 
options.  It may be beneficial for the president–elect to meet with the PFIAB to learn about the intelligence 
issues that he will be facing.  The chair of the PFIAB should have regular contact with the president-elect’s 
transition team, just as regular foreign policy bureaucracies do.  The chair may be retained in an advisory 
or ex-officio position for a few months to help a new Board adjust.
The President
The attitude of the president towards the PFIAB and intelligence is critical.  The extent to which 
the president really understands and is interested in national intelligence is an important factor in the 
success of the Board.  One former executive director emphasized that unless the president understands 
intelligence, its import, and the role the Board can play, the Board will not be effective.  Indeed, the 
administration that needs the PFIAB the most is often an administration least likely to want it.
The fact that the PFIAB’s authority flows from the president makes it important for the Board 
to have access to the president.  As another former executive director reminded us, “Other government 
officials believe you have power based upon your relationship with the president.”  To show his support, 
the president should meet with the Board early in the administration, even if only ceremonially.  The chair 
of the PFIAB should meet with the president every month for updates and feedback.  The next president 
might even consider institutionalizing PFIAB meetings with the Board in the enabling executive order to 
guarantee that attention would be given to the PFIAB at the highest levels, thereby reinforcing the Board’s 
authority and effectiveness within the intelligence community.
NSC Advisor
The relationship with national security advisors has not always been satisfactory.  The meetings, 
according to one former national security advisor were a “necessary duty,” which occasionally degenerated 
into some individual members lecturing on what U.S. foreign policy should be – an issue outside the 
Board’s domain.  There is also an inherent conflict between the Board and the NSC because the Board 
does not deal with operations; its role is analytical, focusing on examining what may have gone wrong, 
or prescriptive, suggesting how something in the intelligence community can be strengthened.  The NSC 
staff is action driven.  There is a need to deal with crises immediately.  Accordingly, most national security 
advisors did not attach much importance to dealing with the Board.  A president and national security 
advisor constantly face issues that warrant immediate policy attention and deal with agencies that can 
exercise direct influence and/or support in dealing with such issues.  In this environment, the PFIAB 
appears irrelevant because it is not geared towards real-time action.  It could, therefore, be dismissed as a 
useless drain on the time and resources of the White House staff.  Thus, it behooves future administrations 
to establish a more formal link between the PFIAB and the NSC so that the national security advisor can 
benefit from the members’ views regarding developing initiatives.  While these meetings occur now, we 
believe that there should be mandated monthly meetings with the national security advisor and regular 
meetings between the PFIAB and the NSC Intelligence Directorate.
The president may also consider having the PFIAB chair attend relevant NSC, cabinet, and 
White House meetings with members of Congress.  As an outside observer, the chair can bring a unique 
perspective to these proceedings.  According to a former national security advisor, simply having to meet 
regularly with the PFIAB and its staff kept the NSC and its staff sharp and alert.  Care needs to be taken, 
however, that any such meetings be limited to conceptual discussions in order to keep the PFIAB separated 
from policy and operations.
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Finally, the Board must also be able to initiate the study or review of issues itself.  It is important 
that the Board, including its staff, have good working relationships with the NSC and its staff, but in the 
end the PFIAB must retain its independence as a presidential advisory board.
Commission
One of the strengths – but also a potential weakness – is that the PFIAB is subject to the whims of 
each president.  To help institutionalize these recommendations, the next president should consider setting 
up an independent panel to study the effectiveness of the PFIAB and to make recommended changes. 
Admittedly, such changes might fit that particular president’s view of intelligence and the role of the 
PFIAB, but not necessarily his successors.  The recommendations of the panel, if accepted, can then 
be issued as an executive order.  The prestige of the panel and the executive order should then serve as 
a template for future presidents in structuring their own PFIABs.  In this manner, a uniform structure 
regarding membership, selection, and meetings can be put in place that will guide all future PFIABs.
Intelligence Studies
One of the ironies of the various scholarly and governmental assessments of the U.S. intelligence 
community over the years is that no in-depth study of the role of the PFIAB has been undertaken.  The 
PFIAB has historically resisted, and even thwarted such efforts, defending, wrongly in our view, an overly 
broad and expansive definition of executive privilege that isolates the Board even from other executive 
branch agencies.  This mindset contributes to the inability of the intelligence community to fully realize 
that the PFIAB can be a serious partner in intelligence work.  Any future studies of the intelligence 
community need to incorporate an analysis of the PFIAB.  Such in-house studies will help identify what 
the rest of the intelligence community seeks from the PFIAB.  For this to happen, the PFIAB will have to 
fully cooperate in such efforts.
Conclusion
The mandate for the Board is set if and when the president issues or reissues a pertinent executive 
order which empowers the PFIAB as a part-time intelligence advisory body to initiate studies on its own 
and to respond to presidential requests.  The executive order does not prevent or hinder the president in 
any way from turning to the national security advisor, secretaries of state and defense, the DNI, or any 
other component of the intelligence community for studies and recommendations.  The value added of 
the PFIAB, however, is that it functions outside the political, managerial, and bureaucratic world of an 
administration.  Such a perspective has been, and will continue to be, in our view, invaluable to presidents 
as they formulate and implement intelligence policies.
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